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the continental powers, though his treatment of Austria in the matter of Napoleon's second marriage does not adequately deal with the baseness of both Francis and his daughter. We note his conclusion that the real turn of Napoleon's fortunes was during the first Saxon campaign, wherein the armistice of Poischwitz proved fatal to ultimate military success. The point is well made and the proof is conclusive.

Finally, it is noteworthy that a writer who is not a military specialist has known how to thread his way firmly and skilfully through the mazes of Napoleon's strategy and tactics. For the intelligent reader there is ample discussion of all the great events which were the basis of the Emperor's strength. There is a fine exclusion of unnecessary detail, and a concise statement of important outline. We venture to think that the campaigns of Marengo and Waterloo are both delineated with magisterial power. It may be objected that there is an absence of imaginative and thrilling description in Mr. Rose's battle scenes, and a consequent lack of the effect which is alone the ideal truth of literature. These volumes make no claim, we must repeat, to high literary quality. They are something quite different, the careful work of an erudite scholar and investigator, marked in the statement of facts by an exaggerated simplicity and calm. The quelling rhetoric is reserved to bring out here and there at intervals the pent up emotions of the author, which are often those of a gallant but rather desperate knight coping with a task almost superhuman in its dimensions. No wonder. It is exactly this attitude of mind which is Mr. Rose's greatest strength.

A History of the Peninsular War. By CHARLES OMAN. Vol. I.

From the Treaty of Fontainebleau to the Battle of Corunna.
(Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1902. Pp. xvi, 656.)

Les Guerres d'Espagne sous Napoléon. Par E. GUILLON. (Paris: Plon-Nourrit et Cie. 1902. Pp. v, 364.)

IN reviewing Napoleon's wonderful work as a captain we find the war in the Iberian peninsula from 1808 to 1813, while less important because the Emperor was there for but a brief period, yet by no means the least interesting. To Anglo-Saxons it is ever memorable as being the field where our cousins of the British army had almost the only chance to display their courage and constancy; for it was at sea that Great Britain dealt her heaviest blows at Napoleon, as it was by her subsidies that she most heartily contested his continental system. Except as a drain of men at a period when France could no longer stand the drain (and the Peninsular War cost France three hundred thousand men), Spain had less influence than any other extended field in the grand total of land operations. But it was the theater where the second of England's great soldiers, Wellington, played his part; and though a proper perspective makes Spain but one scene in the vast Napoleonic drama, yet the conflict loses not its military nor its human interest; and to all English-speaking peoples it is a tale which may always be twice

told. Perhaps no war has ever brought out more monographs and fewer histories. From general to sergeant, every rank has had its say, in Spanish, French, Portuguese, and English. But, excepting alone the monumental work of Napier, there has yet to be written a satisfactory history of the entire Iberian struggle.

We have before us two volumes, one from a French standpoint, the other from the English. Beginning with the less ambitious, for Professor Oman's volume is but the first of several, Professor Guillon proposes to himself to make a *croquis* of the Peninsular campaign which shall assemble all the facts relating thereto, and only these, so that a French reader shall not have to turn to memoirs, general histories of Napoleon's wars, or histories written by a foreign pen. "To replace these wars in the particular and natural frame, to narrate them in a manner clear, rapid, and summary, without technical pretension nor theory, to retrace their vicissitudes, and to render if possible their color, I have thought this work might be useful." The idea came to him in Spain, and he preceded his work by a pilgrimage to the principal battle-fields.

The author has done what he proposed, but the book is scarcely a history of the Peninsular Wars in the sense that Napier wrote it sixty years ago and that Oman is writing it to-day. It is a sketch only, for in the compass of 350 small pages no one can give more than a syllabus of the marches and countermarches, the toils and dangers, the skirmishes and battles of the dozen armies of French, Spanish, Portuguese, and English, not to mention the thousands of guerrilla bands which by their small-war made the task of the French so much the harder.

Guillon's book is fair. Though writing from the French standpoint, he does not underrate the value or deeds of the defenders of the peninsula, but he devotes much space to explaining why the French failed. He loads most of the blame upon the Emperor, who, indeed, by retaining personal control of matters at such a distance, by diverting Spanish revenues to the French army budget, and by unwise interference in many quarters certainly deserves much of it. To any one who desires a well-framed sketch the book is to be commended; though, as it has no maps, the average reader would be often at a loss to understand all the author says. And many of the marches and the battles are crowded for lack of space into too small a compass to keep the narrative perfectly balanced. With maps and an additional hundred pages to fill these gaps, the volume would be a valuable one for the busy man of to-day.

When we come to Oman's work, we at once find a larger purpose and a work gauged on a broad historical scale in which, without prolixity, space is a secondary matter. The author has been at work a dozen years or more in collating the subject-matter, and has been much aided by the legacy to All Souls of the papers of Sir Charles Vaughan, a sort of a diplomatic "chiel" amang ye takin' notes," who saw much of Spain during the war. He has projected a work which will reach several imposing volumes, and has spared himself no pains nor labor in searching for facts. The detailed manner, for instance, in which he has worked up the num-

bers of the armies in the period covered is beyond praise. Few authors are willing to take so much trouble, especially as, after all labor spent, the attrition of accident or stress of service may much alter the sum-totals obtained at a date a few days previous. Moreover, a variation of ten or fifteen per cent. in numbers engaged is rarely the cause of victory or defeat.

Professor Oman is an honest Briton and, unlike Lord Roseberry, is writing of a period in which Napoleon was exacerbating to the British sense. While yielding his meed of admiration to Napoleon the soldier, he cordially hates Napoleon the statesman, and now and again in good blunt Saxon monosyllables berates him for his manifold political trespasses. No doubt Napoleon deserved all this, but in that day and generation few statesmen were beyond severe stricture. It was diamond cut diamond, nor was any diamond steel-blue. Diplomacy has always been the art of deceiving; it was more so then than now, we hope. And when we consider that Napoleon had substantially all Europe arrayed against him; that, while his ways were devious, he was working out a problem useful to France and Europe; and that he had to keep his wits sharpened to the keenest point; did he in reality average any worse than the rest of the diplomatic world?

Upon the intricate political history of the Peninsular War Oman enters at length and throws the light of clear statement. In many points he sets Napier right where this author has erred from lack of facts to-day obtainable, or corrects him when, as Oman thinks, he errs from an undue leaning towards the Emperor. The military side is treated with equal detail. The descriptions of the country and topography remain in mind. Strategy and tactics have no terrors for this author, as since Jomini's day no profession monopolizes military history. Nor is he new at such a task; and his style is frank and easy, and fixes the attention. While the reader now and then disagrees with some statement, yet Oman's frank positiveness disarms him. The value of the opposing forces is well gauged; and there is so much detail in describing the manœuvres and battles that the work will have peculiar interest to the Englishman who has a hereditary love of regimental exploits and individual prowess.

As this first volume covers only the period from the treaty of Fontainebleau, towards the end of 1807, to Moore's battle of Corunna, in the beginning of 1809, it is not possible to estimate the work as a whole; but if, as is probable, the author is able to carry it through on the scale he and his publishers have begun, it will go far to be more read than Napier—whose admirable work will nevertheless always remain a classic.

THEODORE AYRAULT DODGE.

A Fighting Frigate and Other Essays and Addresses. By HENRY CABOT LODGE. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1902. Pp. 316.)

EXCEPT for a single essay upon Russia of the present, all of the papers in this attractive volume may be regarded as historical. One is an essay upon "The Treaty-making Powers of the Senate"; the other nine are